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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Defendants appeal the grant of a permanent injunction in 
this civil action for securities fraud. The defendants argue 
that the instruments that they offered to investors were not 
"securities" under federal law, and that the district court 
therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants 
also challenge certain evidentiary and procedural rulings 
that the district court made during the hearing on the 
motion for a permanent injunction. For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
In November 1995, defendants Geoffrey Benson and 
Geoffrey O'Connor formed the Infinity Group Company 
Trust (the "Trust" or "TIGC").1 Thereafter, the Trust unveiled 
an "Asset Enhancement Program" that offered investors an 
opportunity to invest with the expectation of exceedingly 
high return and minimal risk. Investors in TIGC were asked 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Benson was the Executive Trustee Director of TIGC. O'Connor was 
also a trustee of TIGC. As Trustees of TIGC, Benson and O'Connor 
exercised sole discretion of the Trust's investment programs. 
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to execute "property transfer contracts" pursuant to which 
the investors contributed substantial sums of money to the 
Trust for the Trust to invest. TIGC guaranteed investors 
that they would receive an annual rate of return ranging 
from 138% to 181% depending on the amount of the 
participant's principal investment.2 The guarantees were 
based upon the Trust's purported performance experience, 
financial connections, and the ability to pool large amounts 
of money. Participants were promised that their principal 
would be repaid upon demand. Once the property transfer 
contracts were executed, the transferred funds became 
assets of the Trust and were subject to investment at the 
sole discretion of the Board of TIGC. 
 
TIGC's solicitation was successful. It raised 
approximately $26.6 million from over 10,000 investors 
nationwide. However, TIGC only invested $12 million of the 
funds it received pursuant to the property transfer 
contracts, and it never earned a profit on the funds it did 
invest.3 Rather, the Trust sustained mounting loses that it 
failed to disclose to investors. The district court described 
what happened as follows: 
 
       TIGC also used over $2 million in so-called downline 
       commissions to keep the engine of this enterprise 
       humming like a new Mercedes on the autobahn. In the 
       time-dishonored tradition of Charles Ponzi, TIGC 
       substituted new investors' money for real investment 
       return on old investors' funds. 
 
       The rest of TIGC's expenditures were even less 
       investment-related. More than $816,000 was spent on 
       real estate, a significant portion of which went to the 
       purchase and development of a personal residence for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. For property transfers of $1,200 to $50,000, the guaranteed rate of 
return was 138%. For amounts greater than $50,000, the return rate 
was 181%. 
 
3. Defendants contend that the money that was not invested was used 
for "operating expenses" and charitable contributions or that it 
constituted "excess profits." Appellant's Br. at 11. The evidence at trial 
established that the money not invested was used to pay "dividends" to 
earlier investors and personal expenses of the Benson family. Appellee's 
Br. at 12-13. 
 
                                4 
  
       Geoffrey and Susan Benson . . . the purchase or lease 
       of cars for their garage, . . . a $6,133.46 spending 
       spree at Circuit City; more than $2,000 spent at 
       television retailers; over $50,000 in `household 
       expenses'; $5,000 to pay off a home mortgage; $10,000 
       to pay off personal credit card bills; $10,000 for school 
       tuition for the Bensons' son; as well as hundreds for 
       jewelry, bowling equipment and membership fees, [sic] 
       groceries. In short, the Bensons used TIGC as their 
       personal checking account. 
 
       In addition, Geoffrey Benson made an undisclosed 
       donation of $1.265 million of investor funds to Lindsey 
       K. Springer, d/b/a Bondage Breaker Ministries. 
 
       In addition to all this, defendants Geoffrey Benson and 
       Geoffrey O'Connor paid themselves nearly $300,000 in 
       cash from TIGC's funds, none of it reported to the 
       Internal Revenue Service or even documented on 
       TIGC's books-- which did not exist. Lastly, more than 
       $1.9 million remains unaccounted for, . . . .4 
 
SEC v. Infinity Group Co., 993 F.Supp. 324, 325-26 (E.D.Pa. 
1998) (original footnote omitted). 
 
On August 27, 1997, the SEC filed the instant complaint 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania charging "an ongoing scheme, directed by 
Benson and O'Connor, to defraud public investors through 
the offer and sale of TIGC securities, in the form of 
investment contracts," App. 41a, in violation of Section 22 
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77v, and Sections 
21 and 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. 78u & 78aa. The Commission sought a permanent 
injunction, a freeze of the assets of TIGC, appointment of a 
Trustee to manage the affairs of TIGC, and an order 
requiring defendants, and certain third parties (the"relief 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The district court agreed with the SEC's claim that the operation of 
the Trust was "the classic modus operandi of Ponzi schemes." Appellee's 
Br. at 21. For a brief explanation of the origin of"Ponzi schemes" and 
Charles Ponzi see Bald Eagle Area School District v. Keystone Financial, 
Inc., 189 F.3d 321, 324 n.1(3rd Cir. 1999), and Mark A. McDermott, 
Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and Preferential Transfers, 72 
Am. Bankr. L. J. 157, 158 (1998). 
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defendants") to disgorge assets of TIGC that had been 
improperly transferred.5 
 
On September 5, 1997, after a hearing, the district court 
issued an Order for Preliminary Injunction, Appointment of 
Trustee, and Freeze of Assets and Other Relief. Although 
the Trust's funds and assets were frozen, the September 5 
Order provided for the release of funds to pay legal 
expenses and fees, as well as defendants' living expenses. 
On February 6, 1998, the district court entered afinal 
judgment against the defendants enjoining them from 
further violations of the securities laws and ordering 
disgorgement of all amounts contributed to the Trust by the 
Trust participants. This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
Defendants raise four issues on appeal. First, they argue 
that the property transfer contracts that were used as an 
"investment" vehicle here were not "securities" under 
federal securities laws, and therefore that the district court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Second, they argue that 
inasmuch as they sincerely believed in the investments that 
TIGC made, there can be no liability for securities fraud. 
Third, they allege that the district court erred in denying 
their concededly untimely demand for a jury trial. Lastly, 
they contend that several allegedly erroneous procedural 
and evidentiary rulings constitute reversible cumulative 
error even though the rulings were harmless when 
considered separately. We will discuss each argument in 
turn. 
 
III. 
 
We must first address the defendants' claim that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The SEC sought disgorgement from the following relief defendants: 
Futures Holding Company (controlled, in part, by Benson); SLB 
Charitable Trust (a charitable trust established in the name of Susan 
Benson, Benson's wife); Susan L. Benson (trustee of SLB and TIGC); JGS 
Trust (a "family trust" controlled by Benson); Lindsey Springer (manager 
and "legal representative" of TIGC and controller of Bondage Breaker 
Ministries); and Bondage Breaker Ministries. 
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district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the 
"property transfer contracts" were not "securities" under 
federal securities laws. Inasmuch as this is an appeal from 
a final judgment, we have jurisdiction to review the district 
court's decision under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise 
plenary review over a district's ruling on a motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Delaware 
Valley Citizens Council v. Davis, 932 F.2d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 
1991).6 
 
It is well established that federal securities laws only 
apply to the purchase or sale of "securities" as defined 
therein. Steinhardt Group Inc. v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 144, 150 
(3d Cir. 1997). 
 
       `[S]ecurity' means any note, stock, treasury stock, 
       bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate 
       of interest or participation in any profit-sharing 
       agreement, collateral-trust certificate, . . . investment 
       contract, voting-trust certificate, . . . any interest or 
       instrument commonly known as a `security', or any 
       certificate of interest or participation in, . . . or right to 
       subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 77b(a)(1) (emphasis added). The property 
transfer agreements that TIGC's investors executed 
certainly appear to be "investment contract[s]," however 
"[t]he term investment contract has not been defined by 
Congress, nor does the legislative history to the 1933 and 
1934 Acts illuminate what Congress intended by the term 
investment contract." Steinhardt, 126 F.3d at 150-51. In 
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), the Supreme 
Court provided a framework for determining when such 
agreements are subject to federal law. The Court stated: 
 
       [A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities 
       Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although the district court treated defendants' motion to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a Rule 12(h)(3) motion, the parties 
here have treated it as a 12(b)(1) motion. We exercise plenary review 
under either. See Nationwide Insurance Co. v. Patterson, 953 F.2d 44, 45 
(3d Cir. 1991) (Rule 12(h)(3) motion to dismiss is subject to plenary 
review). 
 
                                7 
  
       a person invests his money in a common enterprise 
       and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the 
       promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether 
       the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal 
       certificates or by nominal interests in the physical 
       assets employed in the enterprise. 
 
Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99. Thus, the property transfer 
contracts between TIGC and its investors are securities if 
they were (1) "an investment of money," (2)"in a common 
enterprise," (3) "with profits to come solely from the efforts 
of others." Id. at 301, Steinhardt , 126 F.3d at 151. 
 
Defendants agree that the property transfer contracts 
satisfy the first and third prongs of the Howey test. Indeed, 
they can hardly deny it. There clearly was an investment of 
money because the contracts required and evidenced the 
monetary transfer solely for the purposes of receiving the 
"guaranteed" return of between 138% and 181%. See 
Steinhardt, 126 F.3d at 151 (finding prong one met where 
an investment was made with the expectation of an 18% 
return on investment). Similarly, the third prong is clearly 
satisfied here because the expected return was to be "with 
profits to come solely from the efforts of others." Id. 
(quoting Howey, 328 U.S. at 301). 
 
Our focus under the third prong is whether "the 
purchaser [is] attracted to the investment by the prospect of 
a profit on the investment rather than a desire to use or 
consume the item purchased." Id. at 152. TIGC's investors 
did not intend to consume anything in return for the money 
they gave to TIGC. Whether the investor has "meaningfully 
participated in the management of the partnership in which 
it has invested such that it has more than minimal control 
over the investment's performance" is also relevant under 
the third prong. Id. TIGC concedes that"the TIGC Board 
retained exclusive control over the investment decision." 
Appellant's Br. at 18. Thus, the participants were passive 
investors who exercised no control over the funds they gave 
to TIGC. Those investors depended upon the managerial 
decisions of others. Therefore, we agree that thefirst and 
the third prongs have been satisfied,7  and we will focus our 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Even though the parties agree that the first and third prong are 
satisfied, we must independently satisfy ourselves that those prongs are 
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analysis upon the "common enterprise," or second prong, of 
the Howey test. 
 
We have held that the common enterprise requirement is 
satisfied by "horizontal commonality."8 Horizontal 
commonality is characterized by "a pooling of investors' 
contributions and distribution of profits and losses on a 
pro-rata basis among investors." Steinhardt , 126 F.3d at 
151 (quoting Maura K. Monaghan, An Uncommon State of 
Confusion: The Common Enterprise Element of Investment 
Contract Analysis, 63 Fordham L.Rev. 2135, 2152-53 
(1995) (footnotes omitted)). See also Salver v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(holding that a commodity account is not a "security" 
because it is not part of a pooled group of funds). Here, it 
is undisputed that TIGC's solicitation and membership 
materials stated that TIGC would pool participant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
established because the inquiry is jurisdictional, and we have an 
independent responsibility to insure that subject matter jurisdiction 
exists. See Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 
83, 94 (1998) (federal courts must decide jurisdictional issues "even 
when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of the 
parties to it."). 
 
8. Circuit courts of appeals utilize two distinct approaches in analyzing 
commonality; "vertical commonality," and "horizontal commonality." 
"Vertical commonality" focuses on the community of interest between the 
individual investor and the manager of the enterprise. See e.g., Long v. 
Acultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1989) ("A common enterprise is 
one in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and 
dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment 
or of third parties" (quoting Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 
476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973)). "Horizontal commonality" examines the 
relationship among investors in a given transaction, requiring a pooling 
of investors' contributions and distribution of profits and losses on a 
pro-rata basis. See e.g., Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 682 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1982); Cooper v. King, 114 F.3d 1186 (6th 
Cir. 1997); SEC v. Lauer, 52 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 
In Steinhardt, we declined to decide if we should adopt a vertical 
commonality analysis when conducting an inquiry under the 
commonality prong of Howey. Steinhardt , 126 F.3d at 151. Inasmuch as 
we conclude that horizontal commonality exists here, we need not now 
decide if we should also adopt a vertical commonality analysis. 
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contributions to create highly-leveraged investment power 
that would yield high rates of return while protecting the 
investors' principal contributions. For example, the Trust's 
Private Member Material and Manual represents: 
 
       The Infinity Group Company invests for profit by 
       accepting amounts as low as [$1200] from thousands 
       of people like you, and creating large blocks of funds 
       that are in the millions of dollars. This gives the Trust 
       a leverage position whereby we can command large 
       profits, and have the security of never putting the 
       principal at risk. This is very sophisticated investing 
       that cannot be accomplished unless you have millions 
       of dollars to deposit in a top world US bank. 
 
App. 261a. However, TIGC argues that commonality is 
nevertheless lacking because the investors did not"share 
proportionately in the profits or losses of TIGC or the 
various investment programs," Appellant's Br. at 19 
(emphasis omitted). Rather, TIGC asserts that "each 
participant would execute an individual contract with TIGC 
providing for a fixed return, payable on demand (principal 
only) or on a specific date. . . ." Id. According to TIGC: 
 
       [T]he property transfers were obligations of TIGC to 
       repay the other party to the contract at a specific time, 
       and did not represent a direct interest in TIGC, any 
       other entity or a specific security or investment vehicle. 
       . . . The property transfers were not earmarked for any 
       particular purpose, or even any particular type of 
       investment. . . . Under these contracts, the TIGC Board 
       retained exclusive control over the investment decision 
       and participants were not promised that their funds 
       would be invested in any particular investment 
       program. 
 
Id. at 18 (internal citations omitted). 
 
However, TIGC's denial of horizontal commonality is 
contrary to the record. By the plan's very terms, the return 
on investment was to be apportioned according to the 
amounts committed by the investor. Each investor's 
apportionment of profits was represented by certain "capital 
units" obtained in exchange for executing a "property 
transfer agreement." The number of units an investor 
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purchased was, of course, dependent upon the size of his 
or her investment and the investor's return was directly 
proportional to the amount of that investment. TIGC's 
solicitation materials stated: 
 
       [W]ith the Private Trust, what you will be doing is 
       making a Property Transfer into the Trust in exchange 
       for 1 Capital Unit for every $100 deposit. In turn the 
       Trust guarantees that you will make a certain annual 
       dividend. These dividends are a minimum of 20% up to 
       181% depending on the amount of Capital Units you 
       hold. 
 
Supp. App. 77. The materials also stated that "[d]ividends 
are dispersed . . . as the assets of the Trust increase and 
as the Board of Trustees elects to pay guaranteed 
dividends," App. 261a. 
 
TIGC seeks to negate the obvious import of its structure 
by arguing that there are technical characteristics that 
distinguish the instruments involved here from those that 
are "securities." We are not persuaded. The defendants' 
claim that the property transfer contracts do not constitute 
"investment contracts" because the investors were to 
receive a fixed rate of return rather than a rate dependent 
on the success of the investments. The defendants argue: 
 
       [I]f the aggregate value of the investments increased, 
       each contract holder would not share in the 
       appreciation. Rather, they would receive only their 
       fixed, contractually agreed-upon return. . . . Similarly, 
       if the value of TIGC investments decreased, the 
       contract holder would still be entitled to the agreed- 
       upon, fixed return on his or her property transfer 
       contract. . . . In the event that the value of the 
       investments dropped below the ability of TIGC to honor 
       its commitment to a specific individual, the 
       participants would not share proportionately (`pro rata') 
       in the shortfall. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 19 (internal citations omitted). However, 
the definition of security does not turn on whether the 
investor receives a variable or fixed rate of return. See El 
Khaden v. Equity Securities Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1229 
(9th Cir. 1974) (that expected profits remain constant while 
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risk of loss varies does not remove a plan from the 
definition of a security); National Bank of Yugoslavia v. 
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 768 F.Supp 1010, 1016 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that time deposits made for 
investment purposes in return for a fixed rate of interest 
were investment instruments rather than consumer or 
commercial bank loans). 
 
Profits can be either "capital appreciation resulting from 
the development of the initial investment" or earnings 
contingent on profits gained from the use of investors' 
funds. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman , 421 U.S. 
837, 852 (1975). The mere fact that the expected rate of 
return is not speculative does not, by itself, establish that 
the property transfer contracts here are not "investment 
contracts" within the meaning of federal securities laws. 
See Howey, 328 U.S. at 301 (explicitly rejecting the theory 
that a non-speculative enterprise cannot be considered an 
investment contract; "it is immaterial whether the 
enterprise is speculative or non-speculative"). 
 
Moreover, the transactions here are easily distinguished 
from those in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), 
where the Supreme Court held that FDIC-protected 
certificates of deposit offering a fixed rate of return were not 
securities. There, the Supreme Court stated that Congress 
"did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all 
fraud." Id. at 557. The Court reasoned that certificates of 
deposit issued by federally-regulated banking institutions 
differed from other long-term debt obligations in part 
because "[i]t is unnecessary to subject issuers of bank 
certificates of deposit to liability under the antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws since the holders of 
bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under 
federal banking laws," Id. at 559. The Court noted that a 
"purchaser of a certificate of deposit is virtually guaranteed 
payment in full," Id. at 551. Here, TIGC's investors were 
offered no such protection.9"The crux of the Marine Bank 
decision is that federal banking regulations and federal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. TIGC's investors are therefore like "the holder[s] of an ordinary long- 
term debt obligation (who) assume[ ] the risk of the borrower's 
insolvency." Id. at 551-52. 
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deposit insurance eliminate the risk of loss to the investor, 
therefore obviating the need for protection of the federal 
securities laws," Gary Plastic Packing Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, 
756 F.2d 230, 240 (2d Cir. 1985).10 As will become more 
evident in our discussion of TIGC's "investment" in certain 
railroad bonds, the investors here were guaranteed nothing 
despite TIGC's purported guarantee of principal."The 
fundamental purpose undergirding the Securities Acts is `to 
eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities 
market,' " Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60 (1990) 
(quoting United Housing, 421 U.S. at 849 (distinguishing 
Marine Bank where no risk-reducing factor was present)). 
 
       The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public 
       by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless 
       securities through misrepresentation; to place 
       adequate and true information before the investor; to 
       protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest 
       presentation, against the competition afforded by 
       dishonest securities offered to the public through 
       crooked promotion. . . . 
 
S.Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1933). 
 
We take a flexible and realistic approach in determining 
when a particular scheme requires the protection of federal 
securities laws. 
 
For example, in Howey, the defendant owned large tracts 
of citrus acreage that it sold to the public. Purchasers of 
the tracts received land sales and service contracts and, 
upon full payment of the purchase price, the land was 
conveyed by warranty deed. However, under the 
arrangement between Howey and the purchasers, a 
servicing corporation was given "full and complete" 
possession of the acreage, and full discretion to grow, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Defendants contend that "just because the property transfers at 
issue in this case do not constitute securities does not mean they were 
exempt from any form of regulation whatsoever. Perhaps there are other 
branches of government, state or federal, with jurisdiction over TIGC, or 
other regulations or statutes which TIGC's conduct violated." Appellant's 
Br. at 20. However, they do not identify any applicable regulation or 
statute. This is consistent with our conclusion that this enterprise 
required the protections of federal securities laws. 
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harvest, and market crops grown on the tracts with very 
little accountability to the purchaser. The SEC instituted an 
action against Howey because the corporation had not 
complied with the registration requirements of federal 
securities laws. Howey defended by arguing that 
registration was not required because it was not selling 
"securities" under federal law. The "lower courts . . . treated 
the contracts and deeds as separate transactions involving 
no more than an ordinary real estate sale and an 
agreement by the seller to manage the property for the 
buyer," Howey, 328 U.S. at 297-98, and concluded that 
they did not constitute "securities" under federal law. 
However, the Supreme Court disagreed because Howey was 
not merely offering fee simple interests in land coupled with 
a contract for management services. Rather, the Court 
concluded that Howey was offering "an opportunity to 
contribute money and to share in the profits" of the 
enterprise. Id. at 299. "[The purchasers were] attracted 
solely by the prospects of a return on their investment," 
and the land sales contracts and warranty deeds were 
merely a "convenient method" by which to apportion profits. 
Id. at 300. Thus, the Court concluded that the agreements 
were securities. The Court reasoned: 
 
       The investors provide the capital and share in the 
       earnings and profits; the promoters manage, control 
       and operate the enterprise. It follows that the 
       arrangements whereby the investors' interests are 
       made manifest involve investment contracts, regardless 
       of the legal terminology in which such contracts are 
       clothed. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). See also SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing 
Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (finding that a defendant selling 
assignment of oil leases was "not as a practical matter 
offering naked leasehold rights," instead "the (oil) 
exploration enterprise was woven into these leaseholds, in 
both an economic and a legal sense; the undertaking to 
drill a well runs through the whole transaction as the 
thread on which everybody's beads were strung.") 
 
Here, the investors' beads were strung upon the 
gossamer guarantee of seemingly impossibly high returns 
at no risk. The fact that TIGC promised a "fixed rate of 
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return" based upon the amount invested is irrelevant. We 
will not embroider a loophole into the fabric of the 
securities laws by limiting the definition of"securities" in a 
manner that unduly circumscribes the protection Congress 
intended to extend to investors. Rather, we must scrutinize 
these "property transfer contracts" in a manner that 
"permits the fulfillment of the statutory purpose of 
compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance 
of the many types of instruments that in our commercial 
world fall within the ordinary concept of a security." 
Howey, 328 U.S. at 299 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Our inquiry: 
 
       embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one 
       that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and 
       variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of 
       the money of others on the promise of profits. 
 
Id. 
 
We must consider that Congress "enacted a definition of 
`security' sufficiently broad to encompass virtually any 
instrument that might be sold as an investment," Reves, 
494 U.S. at 61. The securities laws were intended to 
provide investors with accurate information and to protect 
the investing public from the sale of worthless securities 
through misrepresentations. H.R.Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 
1st Sess., at 1-5 (1933). As noted above, TIGC accepted 
nearly $26.6 million from approximately 10,000 investors. 
TIGC persuaded those investors to part with their cash by 
guaranteeing the proverbial "blue sky;" fantastic profit at no 
risk. Of the $26.6 million raised, more than half of the 
money was used to satisfy the material "needs" of the 
individual defendants. The balance was poured down empty 
wells that could hardly be confused with prudent 
investments. TIGC realized no return whatsoever on those 
"investments." Given the totality of the circumstances here, 
the property transfer contracts clearly constitute securities, 
and the district court therefore had subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
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IV. 
 
Defendants argue that the SEC failed to establish the 
scienter required for liability under Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act,11 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act12 or Rule 
10b-5.13 They argue that they cannot therefore be liable 
even if the property transfer contracts were securities. 
 
The SEC must establish the requisite scienter to 
establish securities fraud. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185, 193 (1976); Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 272-73 (1998); McLean 
v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1196-97 (3d Cir. 1979). 
Scienter is "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate or defraud," Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12; 
McLean, 599 F.2d at 1197. We have previously held that 
the scienter required for securities fraud includes 
recklessness, and we have adopted the definition of 
recklessness set forth in Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical 
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977). See also Sharp v. 
Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 1993 (3d Cir. 1981).14 
Accordingly, recklessness includes: 
 
       [H]ighly unreasonable (conduct), involving not merely 
       simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme 
       departure from the standards of ordinary care, . . . 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Section 17(a) makes it unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of 
any security to: (1) "employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud;" 
(2) 
"obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement [or 
omission] of material fact;" or (3) to "engage in any transaction, 
practice 
or course of business which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon the 
purchaser." 15 U.S.C. S 77q(a). 
 
12. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits"manipulative" or 
"deceptive" conduct "in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security." 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b). 
 
13. Rule10b-5 proscribes (1) the employment of any "device, scheme or 
artifice to defraud;" (2) the making of "any untrue statement [or 
omission] of material fact;" and (3) the engagement "in any act, practice, 
or course of business which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 
C.F.R. S 240.10b-5. 
 
14. The recklessness standard applies to both omissions and 
misstatements. McLean, 599 F.2d at 1197. 
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       which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers 
       that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious 
       that the actor must have been aware of it. 
 
McLean, 599 F.2d at 1197 (citing Sundstrand Corp., 553 
F.2d at 1045). 
 
The SEC argues that scienter is evidenced by TIGC's 
guarantees of high rates of return that were unsupported 
by any honest due diligence. The defendants, on the other 
hand, contend that their actions "were entirely consistent 
with the fact that they believed their representations (in the 
Trust literature and elsewhere) [to be] true." Appellant's Br. 
at 23. However, good faith, without more, does not 
necessarily preclude a finding of recklessness. Therefore, 
even if the defendants believed TIGC's investments were 
sound, they may still be liable for securities fraud if their 
belief was based upon nothing more than a reckless 
disregard of the truth. Moreover, we reiterate that TIGC 
invested less than half of the money obtained under the 
property transfer contracts. In addition, a minimum of 
$3,649,000 of the funds was spent on such things as the 
Bensons' home, a new Mercedes Benz, etc. Nevertheless, 
the defendants claim that they "attempted to obtain 
documentation and contractual guarantees from the 
investment providers" and "were [themselves] the victims of 
fraud on the part of the investment providers." Id. at 29-30. 
We are not persuaded. 
 
The defendants concede that no profits were ever realized 
from the funds that were actually invested. Appellant's Br. 
at 11. One need look no further than one example of an 
investment that TIGC made to understand why no profit 
was ever realized and to appreciate the specious nature of 
the denials of recklessness. In October 1996, TIGC 
purchased a bond of the Marietta and Northern Georgia 
Railway that had been issued in 1889. TIGC paid $302,000 
for that bond, apparently based upon "unsubstantiated 
boasts of value ranging from $35 million to $107 million, 
and without performing any meaningful type of due 
diligence inquiry to clarify the $72 million discrepancy." 
Appellee's Br. at 28. TIGC paid $302,000 even though the 
bond had a face value of only $1000. Despite the unique 
investment acuity proclaimed in the Trusts' materials, the 
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defendants missed a little glitch in this investment 
bonanza. The railroad that issued the bond had gone 
bankrupt in 1895, and it had ceased to exist in 1896. 
Supp. App. 1-4. The bond was therefore "worthless except 
for its modest value as a collectible (which [was] estimated 
at $80-100.)." Appellee's Br. at 29. Thus, TIGC used a 
portion of those funds that it did not divert to personal use 
to pay $302,000 for a bond with a face value of $1,000 that 
had been issued by a railroad that had gone out of 
business 100 years ago.15 In referring to this investment the 
district court stated: 
 
       [W]e suspect that even a complete neophyte infinance, 
       accounting, or economics would suspect, when 
       confronted with such an investment, that defendants' 
       business was on the wrong track. Instead, TIGC chose 
       in its materials to value the ancient bond at $107 
       million! 
 
993 F.Supp. at 330. It is a small wonder that the district 
court referred to TIGC as a "financial train wreck." Id. at 
326. Yet, TIGC's offering materials proclaimed that the 
unique skill it provided would enable the Trust to 
guarantee very high rates of return with no risk to 
principal. The solicitation materials boasted that 
participants would have "an opportunity that has a 100% 
success rate, for 100% of the people who become associated 
with my business." Supp. App. 74. Investors were told that 
their investments were "guaranteed by a top 100 World 
Bank" and "the returns (Profits) that (TIGC based) the 
[return rate of] 138% and 181% on (were) guaranteed by 
the Trust, making this one of the safest programs 
available." App. 271a (emphasis omitted). 
 
Even if we indulge the defendants and assume arguendo 
that they believed in these guarantees, we nevertheless 
must examine the foundation such a belief would have 
rested upon. A good faith belief is not a "get out of jail free 
card." It will not insulate the defendants from liability if it 
is the result of reckless conduct. See McLean .16 However, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. This investment was therefore the ultimate"turn around play." 
16. We will assume that a defendant can genuinely have a subjective 
belief that demonstrates good faith even though it is the result of 
reckless conduct. However, it clearly can be argued that a subjective 
belief based only upon an inquiry that is reckless can never properly be 
considered a "good faith" belief. 
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under our standard of review, we must view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the SEC as verdict winner. 
Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 778 (3d Cir. 1985). In 
doing so, we readily conclude that the district court did not 
err in finding that the SEC had established the necessary 
scienter for securities fraud. The district court stated: 
 
       [W]e reject Geoffrey Benson's proffered defense that he 
       was ignorant of the falsity of TIGC's statements, and in 
       all events he acted in good faith in soliciting investor 
       funds and pursuing investments on behalf of TIGC. 
       Even assuming that those statements are true--and we 
       do not, given the mountain of evidence of invidious 
       motive here--ignorance provides no defense to 
       recklessness where a reasonable investigation would 
       have revealed the truth to the defendant. . . . Similarly, 
       good faith is no shield to liability under the antifraud 
       provisions of the Securities Acts. . . . 
 
        But we need not rely on either the ignorance defense, 
       or the existence of recklessness, in Geoffrey Benson's 
       case. His actual intent to defraud may be inferred from 
       his wholly successful, and carefully-crafted, offering 
       materials. . . . [T]he materials at length depict a 
       mysterious cabal into which only the initiated, like 
       TIGC's trustees, could enter. Benson's texts weave 
       visions of risk-free, high-return investing in a clever 
       tapestry of anti-government, individualist fervor. 
       Although the offering materials often speak of 
       mysteries and the need to maintain secrecy, in fact 
       Geoffrey Benson and his colleagues well knew that the 
       reason these secrets were not mentioned is because 
       there were none. As Geoffrey Benson and O'Connor 
       allowed their offering materials to be disseminated 
       around the country--by fax on demand, through a 
       legion of downline representatives, and via the mails-- 
       they had to know that they were funding payments to 
       early investors with new investors' money rather than 
       with investment return. In short, Geoffrey Benson and 
       Geoffrey O'Connor knew precisely what they were doing 
       in these materials, and that was engaging in a hugely 
       successful interstate fraud. 
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        At best, defendants' investment enterprise began as 
       a reckless financial enterprise, and evolved into an 
       intentional scheme to defraud investors of their money 
       when that money became necessary to prevent TIGC's 
       collapse. At worst, TIGC's Asset Enhancement Program 
       was from its inception a Ponzi scheme, calculated to 
       bilk investors of funds by preying on their excessive 
       greed, their feelings of exclusion from America's 
       current prosperity, and their fears of jackbooted 
       government intrusion. 
 
993 F. Supp. at 330-31.17 The district court's analysis is 
consistent with the record. Indeed, the record mandates the 
court's conclusion. 
 
In McLean, we stressed that plaintiff: 
 
       [c]ircumstantial evidence may often be the principal, if 
       not the only, means of proving bad faith. A showing of 
       shoddy accounting practices amounted at best to a 
       `pretended audit,' or of grounds supporting a 
       representation `so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion 
       that there was no genuine belief back of it' have 
       traditionally supported a finding of liability in the face 
       of repeated assertions of good faith. . . . In such cases, 
       the factfinder may justifiably conclude that despite 
       those assertions the `danger of misleading . . . (was) so 
       obvious that the actor must have been aware of it. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. TIGC's materials also offered not so subtle hints that TIGC could 
assist in "sheltering" assets where others with less expertise had failed. 
TIGC's materials proclaimed: 
 
        If you are thinking about establishing an off-shore Trust or Bank 
       Account please beware! Belize, the Cayman's and may [sic] others 
       that used to be off-shore havens are about as safe as throwing your 
       money in the fireplace. The U.S. government has twisted most of 
       these off-shore government's arms to the point where they will give 
       out information and let the U.S. do whatever they want to. 
 
        We have access to off-shore facilities that are totally safe when 
set 
       up properly. If you are serious, and do not mind spending some 
       time and money, you will want to contact us to get some of the 
       preliminary details. 
 
Supp. App. 88-89. 
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Mclean, 599 F.2d at 1198 (citing Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 
1045)(footnotes omitted)). Although defendants assert a 
good faith belief that their representations were true, "an 
opinion that has been issued without a genuine belief or 
reasonable basis is an `untrue' statement which, if made 
knowingly or recklessly, is culpable conduct actionable 
under [the securities laws]." Eisenberg , 766 F.2d at 776 
(emphasis added). 
 
       When the opinion or forecast is based on underlying 
       materials which on their face or under the 
       circumstances suggest that they cannot be relied on 
       without further inquiry, then the failure to investigate 
       further may `support [ ]an inference that when [the 
       defendant] expressed the opinion it had no genuine 
       belief that it had the information on which it could 
       predicate that opinion.' 
 
Id. (citing McLean, 599 F.2d at 1198). Here, the evidence 
supporting TIGC's purported belief in its representations is 
"so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no 
genuine belief " in the validity of TIGC's guarantee or the 
soundness of its investments. McLean, 599 F.2d at 1198 
(citing Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 
1931)). The guarantees were "so recklessly made that the 
culpability attaching to such reckless conduct closely 
approaches that which attaches to conscious deception," Id. 
at 1197 (citing Coleco Industries, Inc. v. Bernamn, 567 F.2d 
569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977)). Indeed, here, the recklessness can 
be equated to conscious deception, especially when we 
consider how the defendants' primary focus was upon 
improving their own (apparently lavish) lifestyle rather than 
attempting to get a decent (let alone extraordinary) rate of 
return on the investments of the participants in the Trust. 
 
The Trust failed: (1) to obtain certified financial 
statements from the programs in which it invested, (2) to 
inquire into whether programs were insured or guaranteed 
by a banking institution, (3) to obtain legal opinions about 
the legitimacy of the investment programs and (4) to obtain 
certificates of good standing.18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. We also note that TIGC's "warning of risk" was less than 
forthcoming. For example, the solicitation materials stated: 
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We are equally unpersuaded by the defendants' attempts 
to shift the responsibility to the purported "dishonest and 
fraudulent activities" of the investment providers. 
Appellant's Br. at 28. Although several of the investment 
companies that TIGC did business with are now either 
defunct or under investigation, the evidence is inconsistent 
with TIGC as a mere "victim." Rather, it appears that 
several scoundrels were sleeping in the same bed, and 
these defendants were amongst them. We doubt that it was 
a mere oversight that TIGC continued to guarantee high 
rates of return even after defaults in $7.5 million worth of 
their investments. Thus, even if the initial guarantees were 
not recklessly made, the record would still support a 
finding that TIGC was reckless in failing to modify its 
guarantees after such massive defaults. Accordingly, we 
hold that the SEC presented abundant evidence of the 
scienter requirement of securities fraud. See McLean, 599 
F.2d at 1197. 
 
V. 
 
Defendants next contend that the district court erred in 
denying their concededly untimely demand for a jury trial. 
The SEC filed its Complaint on August 27, 1997. The 
defendants filed an Answer on September 26, 1997; and 
relief defendants filed an Answer on October 28, 1997. The 
defendants did not file their Demand for Jury Trial until 
January 13, 1998; two and one half months after thefinal 
pleading in this case. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 38 states, in pertinent part, "Any party 
may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by 
a jury by . . . serving upon the other parties a demand 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Yes we do guarantee the returns you will make on your exempt 
       security transfer. . . . (P)lease do not interpret guarantee as 
meaning 
       absolutely no risk. There is no such thing. There's a risk in 
getting 
       out of bed in the morning. Or . . . a big rock could fall on Ohio 
and 
       wipe out TIGC and everything else in the state. Remember, things 
       can happen that are beyond anyone's control. 
 
App. 230a. 
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thereof in writing at any time after the commencement of 
the action and not later than 10 days after the service of 
the last pleading directed to such issue . . . ," Fed.R.Civ.P. 
38(b). Fed R. Civ. P. 39(b) provides, "[N]otwithstanding the 
failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in which 
such a demand might have been made of right, the court in 
its discretion upon motion may order a trial by jury of any 
or all issues." Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(b). Therefore, a district court 
may still grant a jury trial, even where the demand was 
untimely made. 
 
We review the district court's denial of the request for a 
jury trial for abuse of discretion. William Goldman Theatres, 
Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 154 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir. 1946). "An 
abuse of discretion is a `clear error of judgment,' and not 
simply a different result which can arguably be obtained 
when applying the law to the facts of the case." In re Tutu 
Wells Contamination Litigation, 120 F.3d 368, 387 (3d Cir. 
1997) (quoting United Telegraph Workers, AFL-CIO v. 
Western Union Corp., 771 F.2d 699, 703 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
Although we understand that the delay here may have been 
partly attributable to a change in counsel, it is nevertheless 
uncontested that the only justification for the delay was 
attorney inadvertence. Courts in this Circuit generally deny 
relief when "the only basis for such relief advanced by the 
requesting party is the inadvertence or oversight of 
counsel." See Plummer v. General Elec. Co. , 93 F.R.D. 311, 
313 (E.D. Pa. 1981); and cases cited therein. However, this 
is not a mechanical rule. 
 
Courts consider several factors in determining whether to 
grant an untimely jury demand. They are: 
 
       1) whether the issues are suitable for a jury; 2) 
       whether granting the motion would disrupt the 
       schedule of the Court or the adverse party; 3) whether 
       any prejudice would result to the adverse party; 4) how 
       long the party delayed in bringing the motion; and 5) 
       the reasons for the failure to file a timely demand. 
 
Fort Washington Resources, Inc. v. Tannen, 852 F. Supp. 
341, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Here, in denying the untimely 
request, the district court noted that (i) "Defendants offer 
nothing to excuse their untimeliness except the fact that 
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they switched counsel in mid-November" -- a full two 
months prior to making the demand, and (ii) "the fact that 
the demand was made only two weeks before trial-- and 
not fully briefed until one week before trial -- means that 
the Commission's case would be greatly prejudiced by our 
granting the motion." App. 118a. The district court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the belated request for a 
jury trial under these circumstances. 
 
We agree that the defendants did not make an adequate 
showing that the issues involved in this case were 
particularly suitable for a jury. Contrary to the defendants' 
assertion, we have rejected an argument for entitlement to 
a jury trial based upon the quantum of damages. William 
Goldman Theatres, 154 F.2d at 69 ("evidentiary facts are 
intricate and will require auditing, if not an accounting[,] 
[w]e can perceive substantial difficulties, though not 
insuperable obstacles, to the framing of a charge which 
properly would submit the issue of damages to a jury"). 
 
The defendants also argue that the scheduling of the 
initial preliminary injunction hearing created time 
pressures resulting in counsel's failure to timelyfile a jury 
demand. Specifically, they argue that after new counsel 
entered their appearance in mid-November, "they faced the 
time consuming task of absorbing and assessing the facts, 
the procedural posture of the case, and potential trial 
strategies," as well as conducting discovery. Appellant's Br. 
at 32-33. The district court concluded that defendants' 
explanations "(fell) short" of excusing their untimely 
demand. App. 118a-19a. We agree. 
 
We disagree, however, with the district court's conclusion 
that granting the belated jury request would have 
materially prejudiced the SEC under the circumstances 
here. Nevertheless, based upon all of the factors we have 
enumerated, we hold that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying defendants' untimely demand for a 
jury trial. 
 
VI. 
 
The defendants contend that the cumulative effect of four 
alleged evidentiary and procedural errors impaired their 
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right to present and prepare an adequate defense. This 
aggregation of errors is known as the "cumulative error 
doctrine." Under that doctrine appellate courts may 
determine that, although certain errors do not require relief 
when considered individually, the cumulative impact of 
such errors may warrant a new trial. In other words, under 
this theory, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 
However, unlike some of our sister courts of appeals,19 we 
have rejected the cumulative error doctrine, at least in the 
context of a civil trial. See Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit 
Corporation, 879 F.2d 43, 57 (3d Cir. 1989), overruled on 
other grounds by Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 
F.3d 1089 (3d Cir. 1995). Moreover, even if we were to 
apply the doctrine of cumulative error, we would conclude 
that defendants are entitled to no relief because the 
individual rulings that they challenge under that doctrine 
were not erroneous. 
 
A. 
 
Defendants claim that the district court erred in"cutting 
. . . fees for defense counsel" two days before the final 
injunction hearing and thereby "unfairly (hampering) the 
defense efforts to complete discovery and to mount an 
effective defense at trial." Appellant's Br. at 35. In 
November 1997, the district court issued a preliminary 
injunction authorizing a court-appointed trustee to 
disburse $125,000 for legal fees and expenses on behalf of 
the defendants from the previously frozen assets. As a 
result of receiving information that the defendants were 
independently attempting to raise $175,000 to defray legal 
expenses, the SEC successfully moved to modify the district 
court's original provision of legal fees and expenses. Two 
days before the final injunction hearing began, the district 
court granted the SEC's motion in part, and issued an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. See e.g., United States v. Rivera , 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 
1990) ("The cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless errors 
has the potential to prejudice a defendant to the same extent as a single 
reversible error"); Malek v. Federal Ins. Co. , 994 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 
1993); Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 188 (7th Cir. 
1993); Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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order prohibiting defense counsel from disposing of further 
trust assets to raise funds for fees or expenses. 
 
The authority to freeze assets in receivership, in whole or 
in part, is committed to the district court's sound 
discretion. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. 
 
American Metals Exchange Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 79 (1993). A 
freeze of assets is designed to preserve the status quo by 
preventing the dissipation and diversion of assets. Id. 
(quoting SEC v. Capital Counselors, Inc., 512 F.2d 654 (2d 
Cir. 1975)). Here, the district court's order modifying the 
initial release of legal expenses and fees was prudent 
inasmuch as the defendants were attempting to raise funds 
to pay for legal services.20 In American Metals, we found no 
abuse of discretion where the district court denied a 
request to pay attorney's fees from frozen assets where it 
was shown that the defendant had access to other funds 
not in receivership. Accordingly, we do not find abuse of 
discretion here. 
 
B. 
 
Defendants argue that the district court erred in 
"arbitrarily advancing the date for the (final injunction 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. The record indicates that Infinity investors received the following 
correspondence from the "Freedom For America Ministry and Friends of 
Infinity": 
 
       The SEC, government, the Judge, or Trustee (It's hard to tell any 
of 
       them apart) has approved an `allowance' out of YOUR `MONEY' to be 
       paid to us to live on. . . . Each and everyone of you can help with 
       your gift to FAM, along with the completed form provided. Your gift 
       at this time is important because the government has frozen [NOT 
       SEIZED] all assets of TIGC and related entities which makes it 
       impossible at this time for them to fund a Member Law Suit against 
       the government, or to adequately finance their own offense. Your 
gift 
       will be used for the following: Administrative and operating . . . 
       expenses . . . 15%, Private Member Law Suit . . . 25%, legal 
offense 
       fund for TIGC . . . 25%, and investments . . . 35%. If the average 
gift 
       is $100.00, FAM would have about $175,000 to fund a TIGC 
       Member Suit, $175,000 to help TIGC with their legal costs, and 
       $245,000 for investment purposes over a period of time. 
 
Supp. App. 145-46. 
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hearing) by two days" because defense was operating under 
an expedited discovery schedule and "could not afford to 
lose the two full days in which to prepare" for the final 
injunction hearing. Appellant's Br. at 35. This claim is 
wholly without merit. 
 
Matters of docket control and scheduling are within the 
sound discretion of the district court. State of Alaska v. 
Boise Cascade Corp., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982). 
Here, the district court notified both parties, over three 
weeks before the originally scheduled date, that the hearing 
date would have to be changed due to changes in the 
district court's criminal docket. We find neither"actual" nor 
"substantial" prejudice in the rescheduling. The change was 
only two days, and it impacted both sides. 
 
C. 
 
Defendants allege error in the court's refusal to admit lay 
opinion testimony from John F. Jackman, an insurance 
specialist whom defendants called to testimony about 
"legitimate bank instruments and other investment 
programs which produce extremely high returns with 
minimal risk." Appellant's Br. at 36. The defendants 
contend that Mr. Jackman's testimony "was probative of 
the issue of whether [TIGC was] reckless or acted with an 
intent to defraud" and would contradict the finding that the 
promised rates of return were unlikely. Id. at 37. We review 
the exclusion of lay opinion testimony for abuse of 
discretion. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 
F.2d 619, 629 (3d Cir. 1993). Rule 701 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence provides: 
 
       If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' 
       testimony in the form of opinion or inferences is limited 
       to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally 
       based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful 
       to a clear understanding if the witness' testimony or 
       the determination of a fact in issue. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 701. A lay opinion is rationally based on the 
witness' perception and "firsthand knowledge of the factual 
predicates that form the basis for the opinion." Knight, 989 
F.2d at 629 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 701(a) advisory committee's 
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note). Here, it is uncontested that Jackman had no 
personal knowledge of the investments in question. 
Therefore, the court properly barred his testimony. 
 
Moreover, even though defendants now seize upon 
Jackman's precluded testimony to support their cries of 
"foul," it is obvious that excluding his testimony did them 
far more good than admitting his questionably relevant 
opinion would have. In his deposition, Jackman testified 
that it was not possible to guarantee the high rates of 
return promised by TIGC. Supp. App. 153-154. When he 
was asked how he would respond to someone who offered 
the sky-high returns and guarantee of principal promised 
by TIGC he responded: "I'd say you were nuts, and your 
[you're] inexperienced, and you don't know what you're 
talking about, and you're a fool." Id. at 156. It is hard to see 
how the defendants were prejudiced by excluding such 
testimony. 
 
D. 
 
Finally, the defendants contend that the district court 
erred in excluding certain "key exhibits" that they failed to 
list in the pretrial statement. Defendants assert that the 
admission of the documents would have "demonstrated that 
the Defendants acted in good faith, with no intent to 
defraud and had exercised some care in making 
investments." Appellant's Br. at 35. 
 
We review a district court's decision to refuse to admit 
exhibits not previously identified for abuse of discretion. 
Greate Bay Hotel & Casino v. Tose, 34 F.3d 1227, 1236 (3d 
Cir. 1994). In determining whether there has been an abuse 
of discretion, we consider four factors: (1) the prejudice or 
surprise in fact to the opposing party, (2) the ability of the 
party to cure the prejudice, (3) the extent of disruption of 
the orderly and efficient trial of the case, and (4) the bad 
faith or willfulness of the non-compliance. Id.  (quoting 
Beissel v. Pittsburgh and Lake Erie R. Co., 801 F.2d 143, 
150 (3d Cir. 1986)). Here, the district court only excluded 
those documents that the defendants failed to produce, 
App. 144a-45a, and the district court properly considered 
the effect that admitting the evidence would have on the 
SEC. The court stated, "The Commission is entitled not to 
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be surprised. That's why we have all these procedures in 
Federal Court." Supp. App. 59. We find no abuse of 
discretion in that. 
 
VII. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we will 
affirm the district court's Order for Final Injunction. 
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